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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
UNITED STATES v. TEMPIA: THE QUESTIONABLE
APPLICATION OF MIRANDA TO THE MILITARY
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1966, in Miranda v. Arizona,' the now famous "Miranda
rule" was enunciated by the Supreme Court:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant
unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to
secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By custodial interro-
gation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. As for the procedural
safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are
devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to
assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following measures
are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned
that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make
may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. If, however, he indicates
in any manner and at any stage of the process that he wishes to
consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning.
Likewise, if the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that
he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him.
The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volun-
teered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the
right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has
consulted with an attorney and thereafter consents to be questioned. 2
On May 1, 1966, Airman Third Class Tempia, while visiting the
base library at Dover Air Force Base, Delaware, made obscene proposals
to three young girls from the doorway of the ladies "powder room."
The girls left the library and subsequently returned with one of their
parents and with the Air Police. After Tempia was pointed out by the
girls, he complied with the Air Policemen's request "to come back to the
office."
At the Air Police office, prior to any interrogation, Tempia was ad-
vised that he was suspected of taking indecent liberties with children ;3
that he had rights under article 31 of the UCMJ,4 and was advised of these
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. Id. at 444-45. See 12 VILL. L. Rtv. 198 (1966).
3. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter cited as UCMJ],
article 134, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964), it is a crime to take indecent liberties with
females under the age of sixteen.
4. 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1964):
(a) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to incriminate
himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend to incriminate him.
(b) No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or request any state-
ment from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first informing
him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to
[VOL .13
1
Falco: United States v. Tempia: The Questionable Application of Miranda
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
FALL 1967]
rights; and "that you may consult with legal counsel if you desire." When
Tempia declared that "he wanted counsel," the interview was immediately
terminated and he was released from custody.
Two days later Tempia was recalled to the Air Police office. At the
office, prior to any interrogation, Tempia was again advised of his rights.
When Tempia informed the Air Policemen that he had not yet retained
legal counsel, the interview was again terminated, but an appointment
with the Base Staff Judge Advocate was made for Tempia.
At the appointment, Tempia was informed by the Staff Judge Advo-
cate: (1) that as Staff Judge Advocate, he could not accept an attorney-
client relationship with Tempia, because if he did, he would be disquali-
fied from acting in his designated capacity ;5 (2) that he would advise
Tempia of his legal rights and answer any questions about those rights;
(3) that the military would not make a military lawyer available to
Tempia as defense counsel for the present investigation; (4) that, how-
ever, Tempia had the right to employ civilian counsel who would be
entitled to appear with Tempia at the investigation, and that he would
be given a reasonable time to retain such civilian counsel; (5) that
Tempia had rights under article 31 of the UCMJ which were then
explained by the Staff Judge Advocate; and (6) that if charges were
preferred against Tempia and an article 326 investigation ordered, Tempia
would, at that time, be furnished a military lawyer.
make any statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected
and that any statement made by him may be used as evidence against him in a
trial by court-martial.
(c) No person subject to this chapter may compel any person to make a
statement or produce evidence before any military tribunal if the statement or
evidence is not material to the issue and may tend to degrade him.
(d) No statement obtained from any person in violation of this article, or
through the use of coercion, unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement may be
received in evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.
Although the issue was not raised, it is evident that all of the military per-
sonnel involved in Tempia, including the Air Policemen, were subject to the UCMJ.
See 10 U.S.C. § 802 (1964).
5. Under the UCMJ, staff judge advocates were established in order to com-
municate directly with the convening authorities of courts-martial "in matters relat-
ing to the administration of military justice." 10 U.S.C. § 806(b) (1964). Therefore,
it has also been provided that: "No person who has acted as member, law officer, trial
counsel, assistant trial counsel, defense counsel, assistant defense counsel, or investigat-
ing officer in any case may later act as a staff judge advocate or legal officer to any
reviewing authority upon the same case." 10 U.S.C. § 806(c) (1964). For a listing
of convening authorities under the UCMJ, see 10 U.S.C. § 822 (1964).
6. UCMJ, art. 32, 10 U.S.C. § 832 (1964) :
(a) No charge or specification may be referred to a general court-martial for
trial until a thorough and impartial investigation of all the matters set forth
therein has been made. This investigation shall include inquiry as to the truth of
the matter set forth in the charges, consideration of the form of charges, and a
recommendation as to the disposition which should be made of the case in the
interest of justice and discipline.
(b) The accused shall be advised of the charges against him and of his right
to be represented at that investigation by counsel. Upon his own request he
shall be represented by civilian counsel if provided by him, or military counsel
of his own selection if such counsel is reasonably available, or by counsel detailed
by the officer exercising general court-martial jurisdiction over the command.
At that investigation full opportunity shall be given to . . .the accused to cross-
examine witnesses against him if they are available and to present anything he
may desire in his own behalf, either in defense or mitigation, and the investigat-
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Upon returning to the Air Police office, Tempia, for the third
time, was advised of his rights by the Air Policemen. This time Tempia
responded by stating that he had consulted with the Base Staff Judge
Advocate and that he did not desire further counsel as "[t] hey could not
help him .... He said, 'They didn't do me no good.' -7 After this declara-
tion by Tempia, the Air Policemen interrogated him, and he dictated his
confession to them.
At Tempia's general court-martial, 8 which commenced on June 14,
1966, one day after the effective date of Miranda, his defense counsel
sought to exclude the statement made by Tempia to the Air Policemen
on the basis of the Miranda holding. The law officer, 9 however, overruled
this objection and admitted the confession into evidence, and Tempia was
convicted of taking indecent liberties with females under the age of
sixteen. On appeal, the Court of Military Appeals'0 reversed, holding:
ing officer shall examine available witnesses requested by the accused. If the
charges are forwarded after the investigation, they shall be accompanied by a
statement of the substance of the testimony taken on both sides and a copy thereof
shall be given to the accused.
Under the UCMJ, it is important to note that an "investigation" commences
after a person subject to military jurisdiction has been charged with an offense
against the UCMJ. Otherwise, a semantic problem might arise when placing the
Escobedo phraseology, namely, "shifts from investigatory to the accusatory," in a
military setting.
Prior to the UCMJ, the kind of investigation required by article 32 was not
guaranteed to a military accused. See Becker v. Webster, 171 F.2d 762 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 968 (1949); cf. Humphrey v. Smith, 336 U.S. 695 (1949).
7. United States v. Tempia, No. 19,815 (U.S.C.M.A., Apr. 25, 1967) 5 [herein-
after cited as United States v. Tempia]. All citations to pages in United States v.
Tempia correspond to the pages in the official opinion of the Court of Military
Appeals on file in the offices of the Villanova Law Review.
8. In descending order of importance, the UCMJ provides for three types of
courts-martial: general, special, and summary. See 10 U.S.C. § 816 (1964). For a
brief description of the organization of each, see Comment, Constitutional Rights of
Servicemen Before Courts-Martial, 64 COLUM. L. Riv. 127, 134-37 (1964).
9. UCMJ, art. 26, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964):
(a) The authority convening a general court-martial shall detail as law
officer thereof a commissioned officer who is a member of the bar of a Federal
court or of the highest court of a State and who is certified to be qualified for
such duty by the Judge Advocate General of the armed force of which he is a
member. No person is eligible to act as law officer in a case if he is the accuser
or a witness for the prosecution or has acted as investigating officer or as counsel
in the same case.
(b) The law officer may not consult with the members of the court, other
than on the form of the findings as provided in section 839 of this title (article 39),
except in the presence of the accused, trial counsel, and defense counsel, nor may
he vote with the members of the court.
10. The Court of Military Appeals is composed of three civilians and was estab-
lished by Congress in 1951. See 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964). This court was originally
conceived of as "a civilian 'supreme court' for the review of court-martial convic-
tions. . . ." Walker and Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals - Its History,
Organization and Operation, 6 VAND. L. Rev. 228 (1953). Genealogically,
[The court's] roots lie in the historical development and improvement of military
criminal law, a history that is marked by repeated conflicts between military
commanders and interested civilians. These conflicts were, however, relatively
minor altercations until the twentieth century, when large citizen armies in two
World Wars brought millions of Americans, including many lawyers, into inti-
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(1) By being "ordered to report for interrogation [accused]
has . . .been significantly deprived of his freedom of action. Hence,
.,. there was custodial interrogation in this case.""
(2) "As accused was informed no counsel would be appointed
for him [in accordance with the language of the Miranda holding],
it follows that the statement thereafter taken from him was inadmis-
sible in evidence" ;12
(3) "Quite apart from the insufficiency of the warning as to
accused's right to counsel, here the Government did not carry its
burden [to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained
or appointed counsel], and no waiver is made out. To the contrary,
it merely shows accused's entitlement to consult was frustrated by the
Staff Judge Advocate's well-meant but legally improper statements" ;ia
(4) "Miranda .. .merely prohibits the receipt in evidence of
any statement taken, unless there is compliance with these constitu-
tional standards. If the Government cannot comply with them, it need
only abandon its reliance in criminal cases on the accused's state-
ments as evidence. That is the essence of the Miranda holding, and it
is the choice of the Government whether to pay this price for with-
holding counsel at the critical moment of police interrogation."'4
The court then stated that "the principles enunciated by the Supreme
Court in Miranda v. Arizona ... apply to military interrogations of crim-
inal suspects,"'" and that, for purposes of "the merits of the [instant]
controversy,"' 6 Miranda "explicitly and at length lays down concrete rules
which are to govern all criminal interrogations by Federal or State authori-
ties, military or civilian, if resulting statements are to be used in trials
commencing on and after June 13, 1966."
1 7
The purpose of this comment is to show that the broad holding of the
Court of Military Appeals should have been limited to the unique facts of
the case before it, that is, to situations in a military environment where the
circumstances unmistakably dictate that military criminal procedure be
identical to that constitutionally required in the civilian context. The
reasons for urging a modification to the Tempia holding are found in
Miranda itself; in express provision of the Constitution, tradition, and
custom - the three sources of protection for the "rights and liberties of
citizens" when the military is involved ;18 and, in the military cases before
the Supreme Court which reflect the Court's recognition of the fact that
criminal procedure in the military may not be identical to the procedure
guaranteed to civilians. In addition, a consideration of the inherent dif-
11. United States v. Tempia, 14-15 (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
13. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 20 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
16. Id. at 12.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1957).
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ferences in the two societies from which the circumstances of Miranda
and Tempia originated, and the enormous practical difficulties the Tempia
rule will precipitate, should reinforce the contention that the Court of
Military Appeals should have exercised more reasoned restraint in its
application of Miranda to the military.
II. Ternpia, AND THE GUIDELINES NOT BEFORE
THE Miranda COURT
As a preamble to its "briefly stated"' 9 holding, the Supreme Court in
Miranda, asserverated that: "[O]ur holding is not an innovation in our
jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and
applied in other settings," 20 and that: "Our holding will be spelled out with
some specificity in the pages which follow .... "21 During the ensuing
expatiation of the holding, and its ultimate application to the facts of the
four cases before it, 22 the Court repeatedly declared that the Constitution
did "not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privi-
lege against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation" ;23 that the
"warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our
opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequi-
sites to the admissibilty of any statement made by a defendant" ;24 that,
for the present, "unless we are shown other procedures which are at
least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence
and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the following
safeguards must be observed" ;25 and that "Congress and the States are
free to develop their own safeguards for the privilege, so long as they are
fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons
of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to
exercise it."26 Hence, the Miranda holding,27 by its express language and
by the express language and necessary implications of the opinion in which
it was delivered, was neither intended to apply to, nor was it addressed
to, the military.
28
At the conclusion of its discussion of the constitutional principles
announced in Miranda, and prior to its application of those principles to the
19. 384 U.S. at 444.
20. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 444.
22. Three of the four cases in this composite decision - Miranda v. Arizona,
Vignera v. New York, and California v. Stewart - involved state law enforcement
officers; the other, Westover v. United States, involved the FBI.
23. 384 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added). See, e.g., id. at 467, 498.
24. Id. at 476 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 467 (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 490 (emphasis added).
27. See p. 170 supra.
28. Some further indication of Miranda's thrust may be derived from an examina-
tion of the case's "Appearances of Counsel." 384 U.S. at 438-39. The absence of any
arguments or briefs by representatives of the military would appear to be a negative
implication of the scope of the case.
[VOL. 13
5
Falco: United States v. Tempia: The Questionable Application of Miranda
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1967
FALL 1967]
four cases before it, the Court commented on existing protections on the
curbs on interrogation in other jurisdictions.
The English procedure29 since 1912 under the Judges' Rule is
significant ...
The safeguards present under Scottish law may be even greater
than in England. Scottish judicial decisions bar.... In India, confes-
sions. ... Identical provisions appear in the Evidence Ordinance of
Ceylon .... Similarly, in our country the Uniform Code of Military
Justice has long provided that no suspect may be interrogated without
first being warned of his right not to make a statement and that any
statement he makes may be used against him. Denial of the right to
consult counsel during interrogation has also been proscribed by mili-
tary tribunals.30
In 1951, Congress enacted the UCMJ, "the 'Bill of Rights' for Ameri-
ca's servicemen,' 'a3 as a response to the experiences of men in World War
II who had failed to stand mute in the face of coercion, harsh and sum-
mary justice, physical beatings, incommunicado detention, and the like.3 2
In short, the raison d'etre for the UCMJ was the multiplicity of elements
considered by the Miranda Court and thought to be violative of consti-
tutional principles governing the rights of civilians.
The UCMJ stands as the exercise of congressional power, and article
31 represents the congressional determination of the procedure necessary
to protect the privilege against self-incrimination of persons serving in
the military. In Miranda, the Supreme Court invited Congress to enact
safeguards for this privilege.8 3 Manifestly, the Court was not concerned
with existing legislation, article 31, other than as an exemplar, but was
instead imposing restrictions on civilian law enforcement officials because
of the lack of legislative activity in the civilian area under scrutiny. Hence,
the Court of Military Appeals, in deciding whether full compliance with
29. For a clearer indication of the impact and influence of English Procedure on
the present Supreme Court's explication of a civilian's constitutional fifth amendment
rights, see Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 77 (1964): "In the light of
the history, policies and purposes of the privilege against self-incrimination, we now
accept as correct the construction given the privilege by the English courts and by
Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Holmes." This reference to the first Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court is not without profound significance in a discussion of Miranda's
applicability to the military because of the constitutional methodology used by the
present Court when it relies on "principles" and not "precedent." For the clearest
example of this methodology, see Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) ; Heart
of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (footnote added).
30. 384 U.S. at 488-89 (emphasis added). It should be noted that throughout its
explication of the principles being established in Miranda, the Supreme Court made
repeated references to People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr.
169, cert. denied, 381 U.S. 937 (1965), and that court's application of Escobedo v.
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). The court in Dorado, like the Court in Miranda,
referred to the Military, specifically article 31 of the UCMJ, as an area with already
existing safeguards for the rights that the court was considering.
31. Walsh, Military Law: Return to Drumhead Justicef, 42 A.B.A.J. 521 (1956).
32. Id. at 525. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) ; Reid v. Covert,
354 U.S. 1, 37 (1957).
33. See p. 174 supra.
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article 31 amounted to a satisfaction of the Miranda prerequisites for the
protection of the privilege against self-incrimination, was obliged to
consider an element of federalism that was not before the Miranda court.
By taking the Miranda holding as a concrete rule to be applied word by
word to the military procedures followed in Tempia, the court was me-
chanically applying a formula to the exercise of congressional article I
power, a process which, in such area, the Supreme Court has abjured prior
to 84 and in Miranda itself. 5
It is to be recalled that no such issue was before the Miranda Court.
That Court called for effective legislation in this area, it did not pass on
any then existing. Without this consideration, the Court of Military
Appeal's verbatim and mechanical application of the Miranda holding as
a formula against which military criminal procedure was to be tested on
constitutional grounds appears singularly inappropriate and questionable.
III. THE CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE MILITARY
A. Express Constitutional Provisions
The Miranda Court, of course, was concerned only with the rights of
civilians. Therefore, in redefining the principles there enunciated in a
military context, it becomes necessary to consider the express constitutional
provisions which distinguish the rights of those in the military from those
of ordinary citizens. Among the provisions which must be taken into
account are article I, section 8, clause 14: "The Congress shall have Power
. . . to make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and
naval Forces"; the fifth amendment: "No person shall be held to answer
for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval
forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public
danger" ;86 and the sixth amendment: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defence."37
Another constitutional distinction which must be noted is that courts-
martial are convened under article I of the Constitution, the legislative
article, and do not fall into the "cases and controversies" '38 categorization
of article III, the constitutional provision for judicial power.8 9 Inherently,
then, under the constitutional scheme, courts-martial were conceived of as
something apart from the customary courtroom method of administering
justice. The approach taken for the "Rules" and "Regulation" of the mili-
34. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
35. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441-42 (1966) ; p. 174 supra.
36. The last clause in the fifth amendment, constitutionally, modifies only the word
"militia." See Johnson v. Sayre, 158 U.S. 109 (1895).
37. Emphasis added.
38. See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
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tary is necessarily political and legislative rather than legal. 40 As an exer-
cise of congressional rule-making power, military law, as administered
through the court-martial system, is comparable to other systems created
by Congress for the exercise of other of its article I powers - for ex-
ample, administrative law. Like administrative proceedings, courts-martial,
by their very nature, are intended to be flexible4' and are to be charac-
terized by simplicity and common sense rather than by intricacy and
artificiality.42 Courts-martial cannot, however, be analogized too closely
with other areas in which congressional article I power is exerted. For
example, there is no such creature as an administrative criminal law pro-
ceeding, whereas courts-martial commonly involve criminal law and its
application. There is no clear, precise dichotomy to explain the diverse
elements of courts-martial, and the words "civilian" and "military" cannot
be thought to carry the burden of articulating the unique position of con-
gressional power over courts-martial vis a vis its power over, for example,
the Federal Trade Commission, and the Supreme Court has recognized
this peculiar position of courts-martial. But although that Court has never
succeeded in packaging the differences and distinctions, its recognition of
a fundamental principle of American federalism is found in the language
and reasoning of the cases involving the main constitutional provisions for
the military.
In Dynes v. Hoover,4 3 the Court affirmed the conviction of a seaman
for attempted desertion after he had been tried by a court-martial upon a
charge of desertion. Central to the Court's reasoning that the seaman could
be convicted of an offense not specifically prohibited by Naval regulations,
was its declaration that:
Courts martial derive their jurisdiction and are regulated with
us by an act of Congress, in which the crimes which may be com-
40. Cf. Smith, Administrative Law: A Threat to Constitutional Government,
31 VA. L. Rev. 1 (1944).
41. The significance of administrative proceedings arising under article I has not
been lost by scholars of that field:
"Cases and controversies," broadly speaking, are matters in which a court can
determine with finality the rights of adverse parties by applying the law to the
facts as found. Thus, the whole field of rule-making . . . is outside the constitu-
tional competence of the courts, for rules do not determine the rights of specific
litigants but, like statutes, are addressed to people generally.
J. Landis, The Development of the Administrative Commission, quoted in W.
Gellhorn, ADMINISTRATIVm LAW CAS4S AND COMM9NTS 14 (2d ed. 1947). Cf. Muskrat
v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1910):
The right to declare a law unconstitutional arises because an act of Congress
relied upon by one or the other of such parties in determining their rights is
in conflict with the fundamental law. The exercise of this, the most important
and delicate duty of this court, is not given to it as a body with revisory power
over the action of Congress, but because the rights of the litigants in justiciable
controversies require the court to choose between the fundamental law and a
law purporting to be enacted within constitutional authority, but in fact beyond
the power delegated to the legislative branch of the Government.
42. Cf. K. Davis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 447-48 (1951).
43. 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
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mitted, the manner of charging the accused, and of trial, and the
punishments which may be inflicted, are expressed in terms ...
And when offences and crimes are not given in terms or by defini-
tion, the want of it may be supplied by a comprehensive enactment,
such as the 32d article of the rules for the government of the navy,
which means that courts martial have jurisdiction of such crimes
as are not specified, but which have been recognised to be crimes and
offences by the usages in the navy of all nations, and that they
shall be punished according to the laws and customs of the sea.
44
In Ex parte Milligan,45 one of the "great landmarks" of the Supreme
Court's history,46 the Court upheld the denial of the right of trial by
jury to men in the military. Upon the express language of the fifth
amendment, the Court reasoned: "We think, therefore, that the power
of Congress, in the government of the land and naval forces and of the
militia, is not at all affected by the fifth or any other amendment. It is
not necessary to attempt any precise definition of this power.
'47
In 1885, in Kurtz v. Moffitt,48 a Court which has meant a great deal
to the present Supreme Court in the area of constitutional criminal pro-
cedure,49 held that neither a state police officer nor a private citizen could
arrest and detain a deserter from the army without any warrant or military
order. In reaching its decision, it was necessary for the Court to distin-
guish civil and military jurisdictions: "Courts martial form no part of
the judicial system of the United States, and their proceedings, within the
limits of their jurisdiction, cannot be controlled or revised by the civil
courts," 50 and desertion is "exclusively a military crime, triable and pun-
ishable, in time of peace, as well as in time of war, by court martial only." 51
The line of reasoning illustrated by these cases has persisted and has
influenced the outcome of modern cases involving the military,52 and it
would appear that the Court of Military Appeals should have considered,
as did the Courts heretofore cited, the constitutional provisions relating
to the military before extending the civilian principles of Miranda,
verbatim, to the military.
44. Id. at 82.
45. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
46. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957).
47. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 138.
48. 115 U.S. 487 (1885).
49. Compare Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961) with Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 459 (1966) for a consideration of the influence of Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886) on modern constitutional law. The Boyd and Kurtz Courts
were identical.
Since the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is the heart
of Tempia, the Mapp line of decisions is additionally fruitful because of the Court's
concern for the interrelationship of the fourth and fifth amendments which "almost
[run] into each other." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 646 (1961).
50. 115 U.S. at 500.
51. Id. at 501.
52. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 30 (1957) ; Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 783 (1950).
[VOL. 13
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B. Civilian Cases Before the Supreme Court
In the 1960's, a Supreme Court "shift" occurred whereby federal
civilian constitutional standards were held to be applicable in state cases.
This shift began in Mapp v. Ohio, 53 a fourth amendment search and
seizure case, 4 and was extended in Malloy v. Hogan,5  a case involving
the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
Other recent Supreme Court cases have also had a significant effect
on state court procedure. In Gideon v. Wainwright,5 6 a case involving
"a[n indigent's] federal constitutional right to counsel in a state court,"'
the Court, in holding the sixth amendment to be binding on the states,
relied heavily upon the concept of "our adversary system of criminal
justice."55 Escobedo v. Illinois,59 in holding "inadmissible in a state
criminal trial any incriminating statements elicited by the police during
interrogation [without a warning to the accused of his right to remain
silent and after a denial of the accused's request to consult with his
lawyer] "6 likewise noted "our adversary system"6' as being a factor in so
holding. Malloy rested upon "the American system of criminal prosecu-
tion,"' 62 and Miranda itself was a case which raised "questions which go
to the roots of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society
must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting
individuals for crime,"63 and which treated "the privilege against self-
incrimination - the essential mainstay of our adversary system.16 4
None of the above cases involved military matters, yet in defining
rights that must be accorded in state courts, it was recognized that such
rights were compelled by the civilian society of which all those accused
were a part and the adversary system of criminal procedure which is
an indisputable component of that society. The society in which Airman
Tempia was accused differed drastically from the society considered in
Miranda, and the adversary system of criminal procedure in the military
is substantially different from the system involved in Miranda. Thus, the
Tempia court's interpretation of Miranda, and its application of that case
to the military without first considering the effect that the civilian societal
and adversary system elements had on the Supreme Court in deciding
Miranda, seems to have been a questionable judicial process.
53. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
54. As has been noted, the search and seizure cases have not been without in-
fluence on the cases dealing with the privilege against self-incrimination. See note 49
supra.
55. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
56. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
57. Id. at 338 (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
59. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
60. Id. at 479 (emphasis added).
61. Id. at 492 (emphasis added).
62. 378 U.S. at 7.
63. 384 U.S. at 439 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
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C. Military Cases Before the Supreme Court
"Military law," a phrase of art that distinguishes a particular body of
law from martial law, military government, and the law of war,65 has
been described as:
[T]he system of military justice established by Congress for the
government and regulation of the armed forces of the United States,
including such persons as have some connection or association with
organized military units without being members of any branch of the
armed services. Functional relation to the mission of the armed forces
is the common factor which gives rational unity to . .. [military]
jurisdiction .... [M]ilitary law . . .is exercised by a government in
the execution of that branch of its municipal law which regulates
its military establishment.66
In Reeves v. Ainsworth,7 the Supreme Court recited what was then6"
a truism: "To those in the military or naval service of the United States
the military law is due process."6 9
In the first case of Reid v. Covert,70 the Supreme Court, on non-
constitutional grounds, held that the wife of an Air Force sergeant could
be tried by a United States military court martial in England, for the
murder of her husband in England, and affirmed the life sentence of the
wife.7 ' Less than a year later, in the second Reid v. Covert,72 the Supreme
Court, by reaching the constitutional questions involved, reversed itself,
holding that civilian dependents of members of the armed forces overseas
could not be tried by court-martial, in times of peace, for capital offenses
committed abroad. The constitutional question revolved about the article
I power of Congress, 73 of which the Court said:
Not only does Clause 14, by its terms, limit military jurisdiction to
members of the "land and naval Forces," but Art. III, § 2 of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments require that certain express safeguards
which were designed to protect persons from oppressive governmental
practices, shall be given in criminal prosecutions - safeguards, which
cannot be given in a military trial.
74
65. See J. Snedeker, MILITARY JUSTICg UNDMR TIM UNIFORM CODnE 34-35 (1953).
66. Id. at 35.
67. 219 U.S. 296 (1911).
68. For a consideration of the impact and aftermath of the habeas corpus ex-
plosion on military law, see generally Comment, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 878, 881-82 (1965).
69. 219 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
70. 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
71. For a more elaborate discussion of the background of this case, see I L. Ed.
2d 1148-49 (1957).
72. 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (Black, J.) (6-2).
73. Id. at 19.
74. Id. at 22 (emphasis added).
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In effect, the Court decided the constitutional question by first defining
the constitutional jurisdiction of a court-martial and by then pointing
out that the wife of a serviceman was outside of that jurisdiction :75
It must be emphasized that every person who comes within the
jurisdiction of courts-martial is subject to military law - law that is
substantially different from the law which governs civilian society.
Military law is, in many respects harsh law which is frequently cast
in very sweeping and vague terms. It emphasizes the iron hand of
discipline more than it does the even scales of justice.
In summary, "it still remains true that military tribunals have
not been and probably never can be constituted in such way that
they can have the same kind of qualifications that the Constitution
has deemed essential to fair trials of civilians in federal courts." In
part this is attributable to the inherent differences in values and atti-
tudes that separate the military establishment from civilian society.
In the military, by necessity, emphasis must be placed on the security
and order of the group rather than on the value and integrity of the
individual. 76
Reid v. Covert was decided in 1957. The Supreme Court "shift"
occurred in the 1960's.7 7 The treatment accorded military law by the
Tempia court makes appropriate an inquiry as to whether the constitutional
principles of Reid v. Covert necessarily have been lost in this shift.
It is clear that there have been no military criminal law cases challeng-
ing any of the constitutional principles of Reid. Furthermore, one of the
concurring opinions in Gideon v. Wainwright, a case that forms part of
the meaning of Miranda,78 refers to the holding of Reid and the impact
of the latter on the rights of civilians. In 1962, Chief Justice Warren,
speaking ex officio, referred to Reid v. Covert, as a "landmark decision"
because:
First of all, the urgency of wartime was absent. Extended analysis
and deliberation on the part of the parties and the Court were possible.
Secondly, while, of course, the Government rested heavily upon a
claim of military necessity, that claim could not be pressed with ...
force. .... 7.
This stability in military law, and in constitutional law affecting the
military, that has prevailed since the enactment of the UCMJ, and during
a turbulent period for the Supreme Court, seems to have been without
influence on the Tempia court.
75. In United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955), the Court had
already determined that a civilian was entitled to a civilian trial.
76. 354 U.S. at 38-39 (emphasis added).
77. See p. 179 supra.
78. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 472-73 (1966).
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IV. THE "APPLICATION" OF Miranda TO THE MILITARY
A. Military Justice and Military Society
The system of military justice contained in the UCMJ, derived from
Congressional article I power, is aimed at a "balance of maximum military
performance and maximum justice within the armed forces. 80 The
UCMJ:
[M]eant complete repudiation of a system of military justice con-
ceived of as only an instrumentality of command; on the other
hand, it negatived a system designed to be administered as the crim-
inal is administered in a civilian criminal court. The Code contains
all the criminal law and procedure governing the Army, Navy, Air
Force and Coast Guard both in time of peace and in time of war.
8 1
Congress, in order to effect its goal, went much further than did the fifth
amendment in protecting the serviceman's rights centering on the privilege
against self-incrimination.
82
Military customs have always been a prime source of unwritten mili-
tary law, and when the UCMJ was enacted, many military customs that
were left unchanged by statute were adopted by Congress as part of the
UCMJ. 88 One important change which the UCMJ did effect was that
"[U]nder the Uniform Code, an accused has the right to be represented
by counsel at the pretrial investigation [that is, an article 32 investiga-
tion8 4], during the trial. . . . If he cannot procure his own choice of
counsel, counsel woill be provided for him."8 5 Those changes to military
law which were effected by the UCMJ were not universally acclaimed
by those responsible for administering and implementing military law.
Opponents of the changes believed that servicemen had been given un-
precedented new rights and that the new safeguards established to pro-
tect those rights were incompatible with the interests and duties of the
military establishment. 86 Shortly after the enactment of the UCMJ, at-
tempts were made to restore military law to its pre-UCMJ status, but
successful resistance to such attempts centered on the belief that "these
new proposals would affect a man accused by the military from the time
he becomes a suspect to the time of his last appeal, and would naturally
reduce his present rights" and on the fact that the UCMJ contained
80. J. Snedeker, supra note 65, at 4-5.
81. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 6 VAND.
L. REv. 169, 174 (1953).
82. See, e.g., Friendly, The Bill of Rights As a Code of Criminal Procedure,
53 CALIM. L. Rnv. 929, 942-49 (1965) ; Comment, supra note 68, at 885.
83. See Snedeker, supra note 65, at 33-34.
84. See p. 171 & note 6 supra.
85. Snedeker, supra note 65, at 449.
86. Walsh, supra note 31, at 522.
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"rights given by Congress only after careful study and loud public
outcry."
87
Because military law is unique, it has not been deemed a bludgeoning
of the obvious to assert that military justice is composed of two elements,
namely, a justice element and a military element.88 The justice element has
been thought "to include those safeguards and other legal values which
are a part of informed criminal law administration in the civilian com-
munity," whereas the military element comprehends "acute considerations
of discipline in an abnormal social situation, limitations growing out of
the burdens, realities and necessities of military operations, and the like."8 9
Hence, the Court of Military Appeals was intended by Congress to act
in a "dual capacity" so that, under principles of military criminal law, the
court-martial system of justice could function efficiently and so that, con-
comitantly, justice would be done to both the individual accused and to
the military establishment of which the accused was a part.90
The military society, or, as it is frequently referred to by the courts,
the "military establishment,""' is not a free society. It is not a democratic
society; for example, the "one-man one-vote" principle will never be in-
voked to determine representation. To the citizen of the civilian com-
munity, the military society represents an "alien societal context.
'9 2
"Military necessity" is a phrase subject to much abuse and is often mis-
used as a means of abusing "military law" when the target of an attack
is, in reality, the law of war 93 or of an emergency situation.9 4 The phrase
is, however, properly denotative of a necessity9 5 arising from the inherent
differences between civilian and military societies.
In the area of criminal law, civilian society has been concerned
with striking "a fair balance between society's need for protection against
crime and the interests of suspected and accused persons, a balance based
on thorough investigation of facts and consideration of the views of all
parts of the spectrum." 96 Elements in the military that are generally not
87. Id. at 522, 525 (emphasis added).
88. See, e.g., Brosman, Foreward to the Symposium on Military Justice, the
Court: Freer than Most, 6 VAND. L. Riv. 166 (1953).
89. Id. at 167.
90. See Walker and Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals - Its History,
Organization and Operation, 6 VAND. L. Riv. 228, 239 (1953).
91. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957).
92. See Anticau, Courts-Martial and the Constitution, 33 MARQ. L. REv. 25,
32 (1949).
93. See, e.g., J. SNZDEKER, supra note 65, at 33-36.
94. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39-40 (1957).
95. The social structure of the United States itself points to another necessity:
Democracy under our Constitution calls for judicial deference to the coordinate
branches of the Government and their judgment of what is essential to the pro-
tection of the Nation. . . . In our democracy it is still the Legislature and the
elected Executive who have the primary responsibility for fashioning and execut-
ing policy consistent with the Constitution.
Warren, supra note 79, at 202 (emphasis added).
96. Friendly, supra note 82, at 929. Compare p. 182 supra. For an examina-
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of particular moment to a civilian community are factors such as the
greatly increased possibility of witnesses being unavailable, the probability
that defense counsel would be assigned elsewhere, the absence of anything
comparable to bond,97 and, in particular, the possibility of "command in-
fluence."98 These considerations, particularly the factor pivoting on the
distinct natures of the civilian and military societies, make the balance
sought by the civilian community different, and "more difficult by the
fact that while the military serves the vital function of preserving the
existence of the nation, it is, at the same time, the one element of govern-
ment that exercises a type of authority not easily assimilated in a free
society."99 These differences make the implementation of constitutional
principles in the armed forces inevitably different from that in civilian
society, including the areas of police and investigative procedure.100
B. The Practicalities of Implementation
The prospective eye of the Miranda Court, and the source and length
of time for which the evils that it was remedying had endured, deserve
paramount consideration because the effect of mechanically applying the
untranslated-to-military holding of Miranda could conceivably destroy exist-
ing exemplary safeguards for the individuals within the military and, at the
same time, generate broad unjust effects detrimental to both the indi-
vidual and to the military. Furthermore, due to the peculiar constitutional
structure of military society, a society necessarily representing a true
cross-section of our total society, and not just a sector of that society,
it is not inconceivable that more weight could be given to the practical
effect of a Court of Military Appeals' decision on individuals taken
collectively, rather than on an individual considered in absolute isolation,
than is merited in a civilian criminal procedure case.
If a crime occurs on a ship at sea on peacetime maneuvers, the
Tempia decision makes investigatory procedure at sea legally uncertain
for the military authorities. Suppose, as in Tempia, there are eyewitnesses.
Should the suspect be ordered to report for questioning to an officer
designated to investigate? Would such an order mark the time at which
the suspect's right to counsel attaches? The question poses unique con-
siderations alien to most civilian criminal situations: (1) At present, most
ships do not carry lawyers. If they must now reverse this long tradition,
is it for a judicial decision to effect such a change? And, wouldn't two
lawyers now be required aboard each ship, irrespective of size, so that
justice for both sides is preserved? What effects on the normal operating
and administrative routines of a ship would there be by the mere presence
97. See, e.g., Antieau, supra note 92, at 27.
98. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 & n.65 (1957).
99. Warren, supra note 79, at 182 (emphasis added).
100. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 68, at 885.
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of lawyers aboard ships engaged in the "business" of preparing to fight
wars?1°1 Again, is this an area where judicial power should be exerted?
(2) Should personnel ignore the incident until a scheduled return to port
or should the ship initiate a request for permission to terminate its activi-
ties and return to port for a proper investigation? The former choice over-
looks the sense of urgency and the nature of the community if it is seri-
ously proffered as a solution, particularly if the incident is, for example
a theft or a morals offense. The latter alternative clearly reflects an
alternative whose very utterance suggests that such a requirement, com-
pelled because of judicial power, is untenable. (3) Admittedly, the suspect
could be detained in isolation until a normal return to port. Assuming
a valid arrest could be made so that the detention escapes conversion into
an unconstitutional incommunicado restraint, is such detention fair to the
suspect, his shipmates, and his ship? Someone would be required to be
placed as a guard over the suspect, particularly if the offense alleged is
of a serious nature. What effect will this depletion of the manpower
reserve have on the ship's ability to continue her mission? Or, must
each ship now carry an excess of men, if possible, to provide for such
contingency - and, if so, are they to be trained equivalents of Air Police-
men and Air Force Base Judge Advocates? (4) Has Tempia effected, sub
silentio, the death of the summary and special courts-martial, neither of
which presently provide for lawyers? Was there reason and evidence
such as existed in Miranda to cause such an effect? And if this is so,
should this have been achieved in the manner which Tempia chose?
In the same vein, the Tempia decision affects all military services
and not merely the Air Force. If the Air Force, at all of its bases having
base libraries and base dependents, can comply with the decision what
about the demands of the other services?
V. CONCLUSION
The Tempia court considered the military base library as the equiva-
lent of a civilian library. Geographically and physically, this may be so,
but, practically, and constitutionally, a significant difference arises when
alleged crimes occur on federal or state territory. This is but a truism,
but the principles of federalism that still have vitality have been known
to cause different legal results when numbers of people have been in-
volved. 0 2 The constitutional dichotomy between civilian and military
may not be as neat, nor as strong, but it nonetheless exists and must be
accounted for. In Miranda, the Court solemnly warned: "When federal
officials arrest an individual, they must as always comply with the dic-
tates of the congressional legislation and cases thereunder.' 03 The ele-
101. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 35 (1957).
102. Compare Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) with Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186 (1962) (reapportionment).
103. 384 U.S. at 463 n.32.
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ment of the UCMJ, it is submitted, involves this principle and suggests
that not even the Supreme Court would mechanically apply its Miranda
holding as a formula were it to review a case involving compliance with
mandatory legislation in the field of criminal procedure.
Miranda was not a hasty decision and the focus of the Court is
reasonably clear. Can the Court of Military Appeals assert this of itself
in the Tempia case?
lames F. Falco
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